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VETERAN POLICE OFFICERS AND THREE-DOLLAR STEAKS:  
THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Kit Kinports* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses two issues surrounding probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion that test the line between subjective and objective standards in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence:  the extent to which a particular police officer’s train-
ing and experience ought to be considered in measuring probable cause and rea-
sonable suspicion, and the relevance of the officer’s subjective beliefs about the pres-
ence of a weapon in assessing the reasonable suspicion required to justify a frisk.  
Although both questions have split the lower courts and remain unresolved by the 
Supreme Court, the majority of courts treat them inconsistently, recognizing the 
importance of an officer’s training, experience, and even knowledge in making 
probable cause determinations but ignoring her actual beliefs about the absence of a 
weapon in evaluating the permissibility of a frisk.  This Article maintains that 
there is a connection between the two concepts and rejects the prevailing view that 
the former is a permissible objective consideration and the latter an impermissible 
subjective inquiry.  Rather, the Article equates the two scenarios, concluding that 
just as a particular police officer’s knowledge, training, and experience can help 
inform the probable cause analysis, so too the officer’s subjective belief that a sus-
pect is unarmed should be considered in deciding whether she had the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to frisk. 
“North Philly, May 4, 2001.  Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike 
Force, was working the morning shift.  Undercover surveillance.  The 
neighborhood?  Tough as a three-dollar steak.  Devlin knew.  Five years 
on the beat, nine months with the Strike Force.  He’d made fifteen, twen-
ty drug busts in the neighborhood. 
Devlin spotted him:  a lone man on the corner.  Another ap-
proached.  Quick exchange of words.  Cash handed over; small objects 
handed back.  Each man then quickly on his own way.  Devlin knew the 
guy wasn’t buying bus tokens.  He radioed a description and Officer 
Stein picked up the buyer.  Sure enough:  three bags of crack in the guy’s 
pocket.  Head downtown and book him.  Just another day at the office.”1 
 
 * Professor of Law & Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Pennsylvania State 
University Dickinson School of Law. 
 1 Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. 448, 448–49 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari) (concluding that probable cause exists in cases where “experienced po-
lice officers observ[e] hand-to-hand exchanges of cash for small, unknown objects in 
high-crime neighborhoods”). 
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Thus begins Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent from denial of certio-
rari in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap.  Perhaps the Chief Justice’s choice of 
language was merely a tongue-in-cheek effort to show his “playful 
side”2 or his “flair for Sam Spade-style rhetoric.”3  Perhaps instead he 
was deliberately courting “media attention” in the hopes that his opi-
nion would be “read closely” by the lower courts.4  Whatever the ex-
planation for the Chief Justice’s colorful language, he clearly was of 
the view that Officer Devlin’s experience on the police force and fa-
miliarity with the Philadelphia neighborhood were relevant in assess-
ing probable cause.5 
Although the opinion in Dunlap reflects the views of only two Jus-
tices—Justice Kennedy signed on to the Chief Justice’s dissent—it is 
consistent with statements made by a majority of the Court in numer-
ous opinions that apply the related concepts of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion.  In fact, just three months after the Dunlap dis-
sent was issued, the five Justices in the majority in Herring v. United 
States mentioned in passing that “a particular officer’s knowledge and 
experience” are relevant factors in assessing probable cause.6  Sugges-
tions to the contrary have occasionally appeared, but the Court has 
been reasonably consistent in explicitly stating, or at least assuming, 
that a police officer’s training and experience help support the exis-
tence of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.  And the lower 
courts have followed suit. 
Despite the courts’ understandable use of police training and ex-
pertise to bolster claims of probable cause, their reliance on the cha-
racteristics of an individual police officer creates some tension with 
the Supreme Court’s purported rejection of subjective considerations 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally—and, in particular, 
with the Court’s admonition that probable cause and reasonable sus-
 
 2 Adam Liptak, From the Bench, a Flair for Hard-Boiled Crime Writing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2008, at A19. 
 3 Bill Mears, Chief Justice Roberts Shows His Writing Chops, CNN, Oct. 14, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/14/roberts.mystery.writer/. 
 4 Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/2008/10/14/interesting-comment-on-pennsylvania-v-dunlap/ (Oct. 
14, 2008, 23:49 EST). 
 5 See Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. at 449 (relying on Officer Devlin’s “experience as a narcotics officer 
and his previous work in the neighborhood”). 
 6 129 S. Ct. 695, 698, 703 (2009) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to cases involving 
“isolated [police] negligence attenuated from the arrest,” in that case, a “negligent book-
keeping error by another police employee”).  For further discussion of Herring, see infra 
notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
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picion are to be measured in objective terms.7  Allowing probable 
cause to turn on what a particular police officer knew, based on her 
training and on-the-job experience, injects a subjective inquiry into 
the analysis. 
The line between subjectivity and objectivity in assessing probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion arises in another context that has 
split the lower courts and remains unresolved by the Supreme 
Court—the relevance of an officer’s subjective beliefs in assessing 
reasonable suspicion.  This issue arises most frequently in evaluating 
the permissibility of a Terry frisk, i.e., in determining whether the re-
quisite reasonable suspicion exists if the officer did not believe the 
suspect was armed.  Although the majority of lower courts interpret 
Supreme Court precedent as mandating a strictly objective approach 
to reasonable suspicion, other courts disagree and define reasonable 
suspicion to incorporate both a subjective and an objective compo-
nent.  These courts take the position that a frisk is justified only if the 
officer in question subjectively believed the suspect was armed and 
that belief was a reasonable one.  This minority view, I argue, is more 
consistent with the courts’ reliance on police training, experience, 
and knowledge in measuring probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion.  Although it introduces a subjective element into the reasonable 
suspicion analysis, the courts have already started down that path, de-
viating from a strictly objective standard by acknowledging the rele-
vance of the officer’s knowledge, training, and experience. 
In sketching out my claims, Part I addresses the courts’ reliance 
on a police officer’s training and experience to support a finding of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  This Part describes the two 
different ways the courts incorporate that training and experience in-
to the analysis, critiquing both approaches and pointing out that reli-
ance on these factors introduces a subjective element into the prob-
able cause/reasonable suspicion construct.  Part II then explores the 
conflict surrounding the role subjective beliefs play in evaluating Ter-
ry frisks, arguing that a strictly objective approach to reasonable sus-
picion is not required by Supreme Court precedent and in fact con-
travenes the policy considerations the Court claims underlie the 
Fourth Amendment.  Finally, Part III ties the issues together, main-
taining that the majority position taken by the courts in the two sets 
of cases cannot be reconciled with one another.  The Article con-
 
 7 For a discussion of the fluctuation between objective and subjective standards characteriz-
ing the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, see Kit Kinports, Criminal 
Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71 (2007). 
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cludes that just as a particular police officer’s knowledge, training, 
and experience should be taken into account in measuring probable 
cause, so too that officer’s subjective beliefs about the presence of a 
weapon should inform the courts’ analysis of the permissibility of a 
frisk. 
I.  POLICE TRAINING/EXPERIENCE AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
A.  The Supreme Court Decisions 
In defining the quantum of suspicion needed to justify a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion (whether the probable cause required to 
search or the reasonable suspicion needed to stop), the Supreme 
Court has endorsed “practical, common-sense” totality-of-the-
circumstance tests.8  Specifically, the Court has instructed that the re-
levant inquiry is whether the “historical facts, viewed from the stand-
point of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reason-
able suspicion or to probable cause.”9  In adopting the perspective of 
the reasonable police officer, the Court has explained that “a trained 
officer draws inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well 
elude an untrained person,” and therefore “the evidence . . . must be 
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”10 
In elaborating on the concept of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, the Court has often suggested that the training and experi-
ence of the particular officer involved in the case are relevant factors 
in making probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations.  
As the Court simply stated in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, an officer 
is “entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience.”11 
Thus, for example, in United States v. Arvizu, the Court observed 
that the law enforcement official who stopped the defendant’s car 
was “entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his 
specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s in-
habitants.”12  Relying on the officer’s “experience as a border patrol 
agent,” the Court pointed out that he found the defendant’s failure 
 
 8 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 9 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
 10 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (describ-
ing probable cause as a “practical, nontechnical conception” involving “the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949))). 
 11 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975). 
 12 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002). 
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to look at him “suspicious” because “in his experience on patrol most 
persons look over and see what is going on, and in that area most 
drivers give border patrol agents a friendly wave.”13  Arvizu, by con-
trast, “seemed to be trying to pretend that [the officer] was not 
there.”14  “We think it quite reasonable,” the Court concluded, that “a 
driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowl-
edge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be unremarkable 
in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite 
unusual in another (such as [the] remote portion of rural southeast-
ern Arizona)” where Arvizu was stopped.15 
Likewise, in Ornelas v. United States, the Court noted that “a police 
officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and 
expertise,” and instructed appellate judges to accord “due weight to 
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law en-
forcement officers.”16  Describing the officer who first spotted the de-
fendants’ vehicle (“a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile with California li-
cense plates”) in a motel parking lot as “a 20-year veteran of the 
Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department with 2 years specializing in 
drug enforcement,” the Court thought that “what may not amount to 
reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental 
highway at the height of the summer tourist season may rise to that 
level in December in Milwaukee.”17 
Arvizu and Ornelas are not isolated examples.  On numerous other 
occasions, the Court has likewise relied on the particular officer’s 
training and experience in evaluating probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion.18  The clear implication of these rulings is that the quan-
 
 13 Id. at 277, 270. 
 14 Id. at 270. 
 15 Id. at 275–76. 
 16 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that determinations of probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion are mixed questions of law and fact entitled to de novo review on appeal).  But 
cf. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 292 (pointing out that while the Ornelas Court’s “two directives”—
requiring de novo review on appeal as well as deference to the inferences made by judges 
and the police—can be “reconciled in spirit, . . . as a matter of simple logic it is hard to 
argue with Justice Scalia’s characterization of the Court’s opinion as ‘contradictory’” 
(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 705 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 17 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 691–92, 699. 
 18 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985) (concluding that the facts 
there, “taken together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer,” gave rise 
to reasonable suspicion); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam) (noting 
in support of finding of reasonable suspicion, that “Officer McGee had special training in 
narcotics surveillance and apprehension” and was “‘carrying out a highly specialized law 
enforcement [drug] operation’” (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))); United States 
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tum of suspicion arising from a particular set of facts may vary de-
pending on what a police officer knew based on her training, experi-
ence, and familiarity with the neighborhood. 
Admittedly, the Court’s 2004 opinion in Devenpeck v. Alford points 
in the other direction.19  In the course of holding that an arrest is va-
lid so long as probable cause exists to suspect the arrestee of any 
crime—even if not the particular charge the officer used to justify the 
arrest—the Court observed that a contrary holding would “ascribe to 
the Fourth Amendment . . . arbitrarily variable protection.”20  For ex-
ample, the Court feared, the permissibility of an arrest could “‘vary 
from place to place and from time to time,’” and “[a]n arrest made 
by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest 
made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances would not.”21  
Invoking the Whren line of cases,22 the Devenpeck Court concluded that 
“an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is 
irrelevant” in assessing probable cause and thus it suffices that “the 
facts known to the arresting officers” give rise to probable cause.23 
Nevertheless, Devenpeck appears to be the outlier, given the state-
ments made repeatedly in Supreme Court opinions predating it, and 
more recently by the Herring majority and the Chief Justice’s dissent-
ing opinion in Dunlap.  Moreover, even Devenpeck recognized in the 
 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1981) (characterizing “the question” to be asked in eva-
luating reasonable suspicion as “whether, based upon the whole picture, [the officers], as 
experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle 
they stopped was engaged in criminal activity”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 
(1975) (observing that the police “are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these 
facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience with aliens and 
smugglers”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (admonishing that “due weight must be 
given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience”). 
 19 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (rejecting the state court’s position that the crime for which a 
suspect is arrested must be “closely related” to the offense for which probable cause actu-
ally exists). 
 20 Id. at 154. 
 21 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)); cf. 
Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1605 (2008) (upholding the constitutionality of an ar-
rest that was supported by probable cause but impermissible under state law, which al-
lowed only the issuance of a summons for the offense, and noting that Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence should not “vary from place to place and from time to time” (quoting 
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815)). 
 22 Whren, 517 U.S. at 810–13 (concluding, in response to defendants’ claim that a traffic 
stop was actually a pretextual search for drugs, that the stop was constitutional because 
the officers had probable cause of a traffic violation regardless of their underlying motiva-
tion for stopping the vehicle).  For further discussion of Whren and its progeny, see infra 
text accompanying notes 83–87 & 137–143. 
 23 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 155 (emphasis added). 
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dictum quoted above that a police officer’s “knowledge” of “the facts” 
can be considered in assessing probable cause.24  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the lower courts have uniformly taken the position that a 
particular police officer’s training, experience, and familiarity with 
the neighborhood help build the case for probable cause.25  Those 
cases are the subject of the next section. 
B.  Police Experience as “Lens” or Independent Factor 
Although the courts all ascribe importance to police training and 
experience in making determinations of probable cause and reason-
able suspicion, a conflict has arisen in recent years concerning pre-
cisely how that training and experience are relevant to the analysis.  A 
number of state and federal courts have expressly relied on the offi-
cer’s training and experience as independent factors supporting the 
existence of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.26  By contrast, a 
few courts have rejected the notion that police training and experi-
ence by themselves qualify as circumstances to be separately weighed 
in assessing probable cause.  These courts do not deny the relevance 
of such experience but rather, picking up on the Supreme Court’s 
reference in Ornelas to the “lens of . . . police experience and exper-
tise,”27 they take the position that the facts purportedly giving rise to 
probable cause are to be evaluated from the perspective of someone 
with the particular officer’s training and experience. 
Thus, for example, in Commonwealth v. Dunlap, the case that pro-
voked Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent from denial of certiorari, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the lower court had erred in 
relying on Officer Devlin’s experience and training as a “stand-alone 
factor” in assessing probable cause.28  The state supreme court did not 
discount the relevance of the officer’s training, observing that prob-
 
 24 See also id. at 152 (“Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclu-
sion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest.”).  For 
further discussion of the courts’ reliance on police “knowledge,” see infra text accompa-
nying notes 59–76 and 142–153. 
 25 See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
INVESTIGATION § 8.02[B] (4th ed. 2006); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
§ 3.2(c) (4th ed. 2004). 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); Commonwealth v. 
Santaliz, 596 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1992); State v. Moore, 853 A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 2004); 
State v. Pineiro, 853 A.2d 887, 895 (N.J. 2004); People v. Jones, 683 N.E.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. 
1997); State v. Bobo, 524 N.E.2d 489, 491–92 (Ohio 1988); State v. Maddox, 98 P.3d 1199, 
1205 (Wash. 2004); Vassar v. State, 99 P.3d 987, 994 n.7 (Wyo. 2004). 
 27 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (quoted supra at text accompanying 
note 16). 
 28 Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 677 (Pa. 2007). 
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able cause “‘is to be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, rea-
sonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the arrest 
guided by his training and experience.’”29  But, the court concluded, 
that training and experience are only “an aid” in evaluating probable 
cause or a “‘lens’ through which courts view the quantum of evidence 
observed at the scene.”30  Accordingly, the court required proof of “a 
nexus” between the officer’s training and experience and the facts 
used to justify the presence of probable cause.31 
The en banc Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United 
States v. Montero-Camargo.32  Though acknowledging that a police offi-
cer’s experience “may furnish the background against which the rele-
vant facts are to be assessed,” the court nevertheless held that “‘ex-
perience’ does not in itself serve as an independent factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.”33  Still other recent court opinions 
mention the officer’s training or experience in analyzing the exis-
tence of probable cause, but do not clearly indicate which of these 
two positions they take.34 
There is much to be said in support of the Pennsylvania opinion 
maligned by the Chief Justice’s dissent from denial of cert in Dunlap.  
As the state supreme court pointed out, according a police officer’s 
training or experience independent status in evaluating probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion allows the officer to “bootstrap a 
hunch based on constitutionally insufficient objective evidence sim-
ply by adverting to his experience as the foundation of his suspi-
 
 29 Id. at 675 (quoting Commonwealth v. Norwood, 319 A.2d 908, 910 (Pa. 1974)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 676. 
 32 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 33 Id. at 1131; cf. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (recognizing 
that “law enforcement training or experience may factor into reasonable-suspicion analy-
sis” but is “insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion absent objective factual support”; 
therefore, the police officer’s opinion that the defendant was “following another car too 
closely” in violation of state traffic rules did not give rise to reasonable suspicion absent 
evidence describing “what facts would allow [the officer] to objectively determine” a traf-
fic violation was taking place). 
 34 See, e.g., Darling v. State, 768 A.2d 463, 466 (Del. 2001) (concluding that “personal obser-
vations by an experienced police officer at a known open-air drug sale area constituted 
sufficient probable cause”); State v. Ochoa, 93 P.3d 1286, 1290 (N.M. 2004) (noting that 
a police officer’s “experience and training . . . may permit the officer to identify drug pa-
raphernalia or drug packaging with a reasonable level of probability, sufficient for prob-
able cause”); State v. Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 853 (R.I. 2006) (observing that “‘the mosaic of 
facts and circumstances [available to the arresting officer] must be viewed cumulatively 
“as through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by 
his or her experience and training”’” (quoting In re Armand, 454 A.2d 1216, 1218 (R.I. 
1983) (quoting In re John C., 425 A.2d 536, 538–39 (R.I. 1981)))). 
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cion.”35  Despite the Supreme Court’s frequent admonition that po-
lice “hunches” are inadequate to satisfy even the lesser standard of 
reasonable suspicion,36 relying on their training as a separate factor 
means that whenever “an experienced officer begins a shift, probable 
cause begins to be assessed against all citizens every time they fall un-
der the watchful eye of a suspicious officer who has been on the job 
for a meaningful period of time.”37 
In Dunlap itself, for example, the Chief Justice would have sum-
marily reversed the state supreme court’s decision based on his view 
that the probable cause requirement is satisfied when “experienced 
police officers observ[e] hand-to-hand exchanges of cash for small, 
unknown objects in high-crime neighborhoods.”38  A surprising num-
ber of cases involve similar facts, and the question whether they give 
rise to probable cause is one that has split the lower courts.39  Given 
 
 35 Dunlap, 941 A.2d at 676–77. 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968).  But cf. Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
407, 415, 466 (2006) (calling the Court’s distinction between “mere hunches” and rea-
sonable suspicion “untenable,” and advocating that the Court “abandon[] the distinction 
between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ evidence and [give] police hunches their due”). 
 37 Dunlap, 941 A.2d at 677; cf. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493 (cautioning that “[a]llowing a police 
officer’s opinion to suffice in specific facts’ stead eviscerates Terry’s reasonable suspicion 
protection” and “remov[es] the ‘reasonable’ from reasonable suspicion”). 
 38 Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. 448, 449 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
 39 Compare State v. Moore, 853 A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 2004) (holding that probable cause ex-
isted where an “experienced narcotics officer . . . saw defendant and his companion give 
money to [a] third person in exchange for small unknown objects” in a neighborhood 
where the officer “previously had made numerous drug arrests”), with Cunha v. Superior 
Court, 466 P.2d 704, 706–07 (Cal. 1970) (finding lack of probable cause where two peo-
ple “looked around as they walked on a public sidewalk in broad daylight . . . in an area 
known for frequent narcotics traffic,” and then engaged in “an apparent exchange” in-
volving “what appeared to be money” and some other object), and Dunlap, 941 A.2d at 
679, 673 (ruling that “a single, isolated transaction” where money is exchanged for “small 
objects” in a “high crime area” does not constitute probable cause). 
   For opinions finding that the police had reasonable suspicion, but not probable 
cause, where they did not even see money change hands, see People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 
1371, 1373, 1378 (Colo. 1989) (concluding that “a brief exchange of some object or ob-
jects” in a “drug trafficking area” gave rise to only reasonable suspicion, despite the fact 
that one of the persons involved had an outstanding arrest warrant and was known to be 
“a user and seller of cocaine”); State v. Pineiro, 853 A.2d 887, 894, 896–97 (N.J. 2004) 
(deciding that “the passing of a cigarette pack in a high crime area between a known fe-
lon and a suspected drug dealer” created only reasonable suspicion, even though 
“[b]ased on his experience, [the officer] was aware that drugs sometimes are transported 
in cigarette packs”). 
   For decisions finding probable cause on somewhat more damning evidence, see, for 
example, United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1150–51 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (while 
noting that “[t]his court has never held that the observance of a suspicious transaction, 
without more, provides probable cause for arrest,” this case involved “the appearance of 
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that the character of the neighborhood itself does not create even 
reasonable suspicion,40 the sale of a small, unidentified object is the 
only remaining suspicious circumstance if the officer’s experience is 
not deemed an independent factor.  Even when considered together, 
this combination of facts does not seem adequate to generate prob-
able cause.41 
But even the “lens” approach endorsed by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court and the Ninth Circuit is not free from difficulty.  This 
assumes, of course, that there is a real distinction between using po-
lice experience as a “lens” and viewing it as an independent factor—
and that the “police experience as lens” approach is not, as one of 
the dissenting state supreme court justices in Dunlap complained, 
simply a “post-New Age speak . . . Rorschach test.”42  Even assuming 
the two approaches are substantively different, they share some of the 
same defects.43 
First, under either approach, police training and experience 
should cut both ways—both in the sense that an officer without spe-
cialized training or particular experiences might not be aware of the 
facts or inferences allegedly creating probable cause, and also that 
some circumstances might actually seem less suspicious to a highly 
trained officer than to an inexperienced one.44  But it is the rare case 
 
flight and evasion” and the exchange appeared to be a “two-party drug transaction,” 
where one person held the drugs and the other made the exchange, thereby giving “the 
narcotics dealer some measure of protection from robbery”); United States v. Smith, No. 
04-11-KAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2814, at *5–6 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2006) (“experienced” of-
ficers “saw cash exchanged for a small object” in a neighborhood “with a reputation as an 
open-air drug market,” and the suspected dealer “instantly fle[d] when they approached 
and identified themselves”); Darling, 768 A.2d at 466 (police observed two separate trans-
actions at “a known open-air drug sale area,” and some of the suspects were using ban-
danas as masks); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 596 N.E.2d 337, 339–40 (Mass. 1992) (the 
suspected buyer was a passenger in a taxicab, the transferred object was concealed in the 
waistband of the defendant’s companion’s pants, and the transaction was “done in si-
lence”); People v. Jones, 683 N.E.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. 1997) (following the exchange, the sus-
pected dealer “suspiciously concealed a plastic bag among some nearby cinder blocks”); 
Castro, 891 A.2d at 851 (money was exchanged for “a white bag . . . . a little bigger than a 
half-dollar”). 
 40 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 41 Cf. id. (finding the lesser reasonable suspicion standard satisfied by “headlong flight”—
which the Court called “the consummate act of evasion”—in a “high crime area”). 
 42 Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 682 (Pa. 2007) (Castille, J., dissenting). 
 43 For discussion of the merits of taking police training and experience into account in mak-
ing probable cause determinations, see infra notes 66–76 and accompanying text. 
 44 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 3.2(c), at 43–44; 4 id. § 9.5(a), at 474; Craig M. Bradley, The 
Reasonable Policeman:  Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 347 (2006) (pos-
iting a situation where a police officer’s “specialized training” leads her to realize a plant 
is not marijuana even though “a reasonably well-trained officer could mistake it for that 
dreaded weed”). 
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that sees police training and experience as a two-way street and relies 
on them to undercut a finding of probable cause.45  Rather, the 
courts seem to use the officer’s training and experience only as a 
“plus” factor bolstering the government’s contention that sufficient 
cause existed to justify the police action.46 
Turnabout is fair play, however, and “a necessary corollary” of al-
lowing the prosecution to cite these factors to support a claim of 
probable cause is that defendants should likewise be able to rely on 
their absence in challenging police intrusions.47  Just as a veteran offi-
cer well “versed in the field of law enforcement” may be able to reach 
conclusions that would “elude an untrained” judge or layperson,48 so 
too, “[b]y the same token,”49 those same conclusions might well 
“elude” the rookie police officer or one without specialized training 
or experience. 
 
 45 For a few older cases and dissenting opinions that do, however, take this approach, see 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 573 & n.10 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that “once [the narcotics agent] learned that [the defendant] only needed a 
boarding pass for her flight,” “it should have been plain to an experienced observer that 
Ms. Mendenhall’s failure to claim luggage was attributable to the fact that she was already 
ticketed through to Pittsburgh on a different airline,” and thus the officer’s “experience 
on airport detail” “negated any reasonable inference that she was traveling a long dis-
tance without luggage or changing her ticket to a different airline to avoid detection”); 
United States v. Booker, 496 F.3d 717, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (find-
ing it “inconceivable” that “officers from the auto theft unit would not have noticed the 
rear [dealer’s vehicle] tag,” and that “a reasonable officer, particularly one trained to 
look for stolen cars and fraudulent tags, would not have glanced at the rear of Booker’s 
car . . . to determine whether there was a rear tag” before erroneously stopping his car for 
displaying a temporary tag in the front windshield); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 740–41 
(Alaska 1979) (finding absence of the probable cause necessary to conduct plain view 
search of a balloon because, even though the officer “had ‘a feeling’” it might contain 
contraband, “at no point did he testify that he had cause to believe the balloon contained 
contraband” and he had been “employed at the jail only two months and testified that he 
had had no ‘experience in the past of people having balloons wrapped up in their pock-
et’”); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reasoning that while it 
is a “well known fact that heroin is kept in balloons,” there was no evidence that the offi-
cer was “cognizant of this ‘well known’ fact”); cf. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 547 P.2d 
417, 422 (Cal. 1976) (cautioning that “[i]t is fundamental that an officer’s observations 
can give rise to probable cause only if that officer had sufficient training and experience 
from which to draw the conclusions necessary to create a reasonable belief in the pres-
ence of contraband,” but finding the officer had sufficient experience in that case even 
though he “would not be accepted as an expert at identifying marijuana”). 
 46 Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (seemingly acknowledging only the 
possibility that a “knowledgeable, veteran” police officer would be more likely to have 
probable cause than a “rookie” (quoted supra at text accompanying note 21)). 
 47 Reeves, 599 P.2d at 741 n.44. 
 48 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (quoted supra at text accompanying 
note 10). 
 49 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 573 n.10 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Second, the notion of police training and experience is so amor-
phous that it inexorably tends to become a makeweight argument for 
the government in every case.  Every police officer obviously receives 
some training, and most of them have had at least some on-the-job 
experience when they make a stop or arrest.  How much training or 
experience is sufficient to count in evaluating probable cause?  In 
Dunlap, for instance, Officer Devlin had been on the police force for 
five years but part of the Philadelphia Drug Strike Force for only nine 
months.  During his career, he had made approximately fifteen or 
twenty narcotics arrests in “the general geographic area” where 
Dunlap was apprehended.50  Did those statistics suffice to make Dev-
lin “experienced” in recognizing drug deals?51 
Similarly, in finding the stop at issue in Terry supported by reason-
able suspicion that the defendants were “contemplating a daylight 
robbery,” the Supreme Court observed that “[i]t would have been 
poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ experience in the 
detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have 
failed to investigate this behavior further.”52  Despite this reference to 
Officer McFadden’s purported expertise, the Court “failed to elabo-
rate on [his] relevant experience,” and, in fact, the officer, “an expert 
at identifying shoplifters and pickpockets, testified that he had never 
apprehended a robber.”53  Whether police training and experience 
are independent factors supporting the existence of probable cause, 
or merely the lens through which the court views the facts, they need 
to be refined more precisely if they are to carry any real weight in eva-
luating the constitutionality of police intrusions. 
Third, the inference underlying both approaches—that a law en-
forcement official is more likely than a lay person to recognize crimi-
 
 50 Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 673 (Pa. 2007). 
 51 Cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[If] 32 arrests during the course of a decade is sufficient to 
turn the road here into a high crime area, then what area under police surveillance 
wouldn’t qualify as one?”). 
 52 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28, 23 (1968); see also id. at 5 (observing that Officer McFadden 
“had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35 and . . . had been assigned to 
patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years”). 
 53 Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:  A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 490 (2004); 
see also Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution:  Terry, Sibron, Peters, and 
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 58 n.95 (1968) (pointing out that Officer McFadden “ac-
knowledged that his thirty-nine years of police experience did not give him some special 
insight into the conduct of suspects, since he had been assigned to watch for shoplifters 
and pickpockets for thirty years and had not had occasion to witness the planning or exe-
cution of a robbery”); Lerner, supra note 36, at 419 (concluding that “McFadden had a 
hunch”). 
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nal behavior—is at least partially offset by the officer’s tendency to 
view everyone with suspicion.  As Judge Kozinski pointed out in his 
concurring opinion in United States v. Montero-Camargo, police officers 
are “trained to detect criminal activity and . . . look at the world with 
suspicious eyes,” and “[j]ust as a man with a hammer sees every prob-
lem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat 
as a high crime area.”54  Thus, assessing probable cause through the 
eyes of a trained officer may well become “a self-fulfilling prophecy.”55 
Finally, and most problematic for purposes of this Article, reliance 
on a police officer’s training and experience raises the spectre of the 
subjective standards the Court has purportedly rejected in this con-
text.  The subjective dimensions of police training and experience 
are explored in the following section. 
C.  The Subjective Features of Police Training/Experience 
Even so-called objective tests are, of course, subjective in the sense 
that the reasonable person inquiry looks—and always has looked—at 
the reasonable person “under the circumstances.”56  Thus, evaluating 
probable cause from the perspective of the reasonable police officer 
with the same training and experience as the one who confronted the 
defendant is arguably a run-of-the-mine application of an objective 
standard.57  Still, as more of the particular officer’s characteristics are 
 
 54 Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (questioning the characterization of the site of the de-
fendants’ arrest as a “high-crime” area). 
 55 Cunha v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 704, 708 n.1 (Cal. 1970) (commenting on the vagaries 
of a police officer’s “views of a location’s crime rate,” and noting that in the half hour be-
fore they arrested the defendant, the two officers there had “suspected four to six of the 
10 to 20 people who walked by of possible dealings in narcotics” and “had between them 
participated in 45 to 60 arrests in the Telegraph Avenue area in six months,” although 
there was no indication “how many of those arrests actually vindicated the officers’ suspi-
cions” and thus it was “impossible to determine how accurate their estimate of the local 
narcotics traffic was”). 
 56 See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (defining custody for Miranda 
purposes by looking at “a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation”); Florida v. Bos-
tick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (defining a Terry stop from the perspective of a reasonable 
“‘innocent person in [the defendant’s] position’” (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“A person acts negligently if 
the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.”); JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.05[A][1], at 253 (4th ed. 2006) (noting 
that self-defense law asks whether a reasonable person would have believed that defensive 
force was “appropriate under the circumstances”). 
 57 But compare Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops:  United States v. Whren and the Death 
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 180 (1996) (arguing, in discussing use of a “rea-
sonable officer” test to evaluate pretextual stops, that incorporating “a particular officer’s 
past stopping history” into the objective standard—as opposed to general police “prac-
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considered relevant “circumstances” in defining the reasonable law 
enforcement official, the standard looks more and more like a subjec-
tive one.  As George Fletcher has aptly noted, “[i]f the reasonable 
person were defined to be just like the defendant in every respect, he 
would arguably do exactly what the defendant did under the circum-
stances.”58 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has gone beyond simply incorpo-
rating a particular officer’s training and experience into the “reason-
able police officer under the circumstances” test.  Rather, the Court 
has indicated, the “circumstances” also “frequently include a particu-
lar officer’s knowledge,”59 such that assessments of probable cause 
turn on “the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of ar-
rest.”60  Again, adding the officer’s “knowledge” as one of the relevant 
circumstances is arguably still a straight-forward application of the ob-
jective “reasonable person under the circumstances” approach, and 
does not turn the test into a subjective one.61  But an assessment of 
what a particular officer actually “knows” clearly depends upon that 
individual’s subjective state of awareness.62  Even the Devenpeck Court 
seemed to acknowledge as much, noting that “an arresting officer’s 
state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant” in assessing 
probable cause.63 
 
tices in a particular locality”—“dangerously approaches [a] purely subjective standard”), 
with Sklansky, supra note 16, at 310 n.189 (rejecting that distinction and arguing that the 
objective reasonable officer standard “can be illuminated by what the officer in fact has 
done”). 
 58 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 513 (1978). 
 59 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (observing 
that “knowledge and skills cannot be easily distinguished; what the professional . . . has is 
a combination of the two”). 
 60 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (described supra at notes 19–24 and ac-
companying text); cf. Valente v. Wallace, 332 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2003) (calling the defi-
nition of probable cause “objective,” though noting that it “turns on what a reasonable 
police officer would conclude based on the evidence actually available at the time (and 
not on unknown facts or subsequent events)”); see also infra note 146 (citing additional 
case law). 
 61 See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (explaining that “includ[ing] a particular officer’s knowledge 
and experience” in applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule “does not 
make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause, which looks to an of-
ficer’s knowledge and experience, but not his subjective intent” (citing Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699–700 (1996))); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 9.5(a), at 474–75 (“[A] 
standard does not become subjective rather than objective merely because it takes into 
account the special skills and knowledge of the actor.”). 
 62 See Bradley, supra note 44, at 343, 345 (calling “police knowledge of the facts” an “inher-
ently subjective” element of probable cause that “may require a probing of the police-
man’s mind”). 
 63 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). 
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In support of his position that reliance on an officer’s knowledge 
does not require deviation from an objective standard, Wayne LaFave 
cites tort law, pointing out that “[t]his has never been questioned in 
the law of torts.”64  To be sure, tort law does consider an individual’s 
superior “skills or knowledge” relevant in assessing how the reason-
able person would have acted under the circumstances.65  And there 
is good reason to do so, not only in evaluating tort liability but also in 
weighing probable cause.  Just as a driver who “happens actually to 
know . . . that a deep pothole lurks in the road ahead . . . can be 
found negligent for failing to slow down . . . even though the typical 
motorist would be unaware of its existence,”66 so too police officers 
gain knowledge about criminal behavior patterns and particular 
neighborhoods by virtue of their training and experience on the 
job.67 
Thus, for example, a police officer experienced in detecting par-
ticular crimes may know that drug dealers tend to use certain forms 
of packaging for their wares68 or that prostitutes typically do not carry 
purses.69  The veteran officer may be familiar with certain slang terms 
 
 64 4 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 9.5(a), at 475 n.32 (citing 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING 
JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 919 (1956)). 
 65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12 (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005) (“If an actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by 
most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in de-
termining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person.”). 
 66 Id. § 12 cmt. a. 
 67 See, e.g., 2 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 3.2(c), at 40 (observing that police officers, “particu-
larly those assigned to specialized areas of enforcement, become familiar with the meth-
ods of those engaged in particular types of criminal activity”); id. § 3.6(g), at 370 (noting 
that an officer “assigned to patrol duty is expected to be familiar with the character of the 
area to which he is assigned”); Lerner, supra note 36, at 413 (pointing out that “[p]olice 
officers, like corporate executives, doctors, and even judges, get better at what they do 
with time”). 
 68 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (“To a layman [a] loose panel 
below the back seat armrest . . . may suggest only wear and tear, but to Officer Luedke, 
who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be se-
creted inside the panel.”); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1983) (officer “was 
aware, both from his participation in previous narcotics arrests and from discussions with 
other officers, that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by Brown were fre-
quently used to carry narcotics”); Commonwealth v. Evans, 685 A.2d 535, 536 (Pa. 1996) 
(officer saw object “wrapped in yellowish tinted plastic” and “had personally seen, per-
haps fifty . . . times or more, narcotics packaged in similar ‘kilo’ or ‘brick type’ wrap-
pings”); Vassar v. State, 99 P.3d 987, 990 (Wyo. 2004) (“[b]ased on his knowledge, train-
ing and experience,” officer believed that wooden box “propped up” in a car with the 
image of a marijuana leaf on top was “what is commonly known as a marijuana stash 
box”). 
 69 See United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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used to refer to contraband70 or with particular evasive behaviors of-
ten used by those trying not to arouse suspicion.71  Likewise, an offi-
cer familiar with a certain neighborhood may be aware that a specific 
individual has a history of criminal behavior,72 or that legitimate ac-
tivities are seldom conducted in a particular location at a particular 
time of day.73 
Of course, these factors alone may not give rise to probable cause 
or even reasonable suspicion, and law enforcement officials (and 
courts) must take care to avoid making hasty assumptions about ob-
jects that are in common use74 or activities that often have an inno-
cent explanation.75  Similarly, they must recognize that “behavior is 
 
 70 See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 691 A.2d 808, 815 (N.J. 1997) (“‘[B]ottles’ is a slang expression 
that is understood to mean vials of cocaine in crack form.”). 
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 269 (2002) (border patrol agent “knew that 
alien smugglers did extensive scouting and seemed to be most active when agents were en 
route back to the checkpoint” for a shift change); United States v. Soto, 375 F.3d 1219, 
1220–21 (10th Cir. 2004) (“in fairly large drug transactions . . . drug traffickers often set 
up . . . counter-surveillance to ensure that they are not being watched by law enforcement 
officers” and “frequently negotiate in one vehicle and store the drugs in another vehicle 
to reduce their risk”). 
 72 See, e.g., State v. Ochoa, 93 P.3d 1286, 1288 (N.M. 2004) (officer knew that weapons had 
been found in the defendant’s possession when he had been stopped “earlier in the 
week”); State v. Maddox, 98 P.3d 1199, 1205 (Wash. 2004) (officer was familiar with the 
defendant’s “long history as a drug dealer”). 
 73 See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (border patrol agent knew the defendant was driving on 
“a little-traveled route used by smugglers to avoid the 191 checkpoint” and “had turned 
away from the known recreational areas accessible to the east,” and that other “recrea-
tional areas . . . would have been easier to reach by taking 191, as opposed to the 
40-to-50-mile trip on unpaved and primitive roads”); United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 
55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (officer saw “a van parked after hours in a school lot known to be 
the site of numerous drug transactions”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 
1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (border patrol agents knew there were “no exits, 
driveways, or roads nearby that a driver might accidentally pass by” on the highway where 
suspects made a U-turn prior to immigration checkpoint). 
 74 See, e.g., People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1378 n.4 (Colo. 1989) (acknowledging that 
“some types of containers might be commonly associated with drug trafficking,” but here 
the officer found a plastic vial that he “merely described . . . as small, opaque, and similar 
to a ‘Tic-Tac’ box”); Ochoa, 93 P.3d at 1290 (citing by way of example diaper bags, taped 
cardboard boxes, and deodorizers).  For examples of cases where courts have viewed 
common objects with suspicion, however, see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 270 (noting that mini-
vans were “a type of automobile that [the border patrol agent] knew smugglers used”); 
United States v. Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 695 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Those who watch the ac-
claimed HBO hit series, The Wire, know that these [prepaid cell] phones (usually called 
‘burners’) are difficult to trace and a favored tool of drug dealers.”); State v. Arthur, 691 
A.2d 808, 812 (N.J. 1997) (observing that “paper bags are often used to transport drugs”). 
 75 See, e.g., Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1136 (observing that “reliance upon ‘suspicious’ 
looks can so easily devolve into a case of damned if you do, equally damned if you don’t,” 
and that “it is a common, if not universal, practice for drivers and passengers alike to take 
note of a law enforcement vehicle coming up behind them” and “adjust their driving ac-
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susceptible to different interpretations depending on one’s culture.”76  
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to use these factors to help build a 
case for probable cause. 
In the end, however, while reliance on a police officer’s training 
and experience may be perfectly justifiable, it turns the inquiry into a 
more subjective one.  And a standard that looks to a reasonable law 
enforcement official with the same “knowledge” as the officer in-
volved in the case becomes inherently subjective—in the sense that it 
turns on, and requires proof of, a particular individual’s subjective 
state of mind.  Again, there is good reason to incorporate the police 
officer’s knowledge in assessing probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion.  But doing so makes it harder to defend the decision to ignore 
the officer’s subjective beliefs in evaluating the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to conduct a Terry frisk.  The courts’ treatment of that ques-
tion is considered in the section that follows. 
II.  SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS AND TERRY FRISKS 
A second issue that tests the line between subjective and objective 
definitions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause is the permis-
sibility of a Terry frisk in situations where a police officer does not sub-
jectively believe the suspect has a weapon.  Can the reasonable suspi-
cion required to justify such an intrusion be satisfied so long as a 
reasonable police officer would have feared the suspect was armed 
under the same circumstances?77  As discussed below, this question 
has split the lower courts. 
 
cordingly”; concluding that it is “difficult to imagine what Renteria-Wolff could have 
done at that point that might not have appeared suspicious to a Border Patrol agent”). 
 76 Id. at 1136 n.27 (noting by way of illustration that “[i]n some cultures, to look directly at a 
person in a position of authority is deeply disrespectful; in others, not to look directly at 
that person gives rise to the impression that one is somehow dishonest”). 
 77 The same issue arises, although less frequently, in cases where an officer who does not 
actually believe the suspect was involved in a crime nevertheless makes a stop (or arrest) 
under circumstances that would give rise to reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) in 
the mind of the reasonable police officer.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 694 
N.E.2d 341, 344 (Mass. 1998) (officer stopped the defendant because he thought the de-
fendant was lost, though a reasonable officer could have had reasonable suspicion that 
the defendant’s vehicle was illegally parked); State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D. 
1995) (officer “did not form any suspicions of criminal activity,” but rather “believed he 
was acting in a community caretaker role” in stopping the defendant); Wilson v. State, 
874 P.2d 215, 218, 224, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (officer made the stop “to inquire about [the de-
fendant’s] condition and ensure his safety” and had “no suspicions” that he was involved 
in a crime, although “[h]ypothetically, a police officer could have possessed reasonable 
suspicions at the time”); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on 
a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State from justifying Royer’s 
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A.  The Conflict in the Lower Courts 
The Supreme Court has treated the concept of probable cause 
and the “obviously less demanding”78 requirement of reasonable sus-
picion similarly,79 and perhaps it is therefore unsurprising that the 
majority of courts have adopted a purely objective approach in apply-
ing Terry.  According to these courts, a frisk is permissible even where 
the officer in question did not subjectively believe the suspect had a 
weapon.80  Although these opinions tend to be rather terse in their 
 
custody by proving probable cause . . . .”).  See generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 3.2(b), 
at 35–39 (discussing probable cause); 4 id. § 9.5(a), at 472 & n.22 (discussing reasonable 
suspicion necessary to stop). 
 78 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  For a discussion of the Court’s recent 
tendency to conflate the two concepts, however, see Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable 
Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649 (2009) (analyzing the appearance 
of terms like “reasonable belief” in several recent Supreme Court opinions).  Cf. Arizona 
v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (allowing police to search a vehicle incident to ar-
rest “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle”). 
 79 For cases where the Court has relied on its reasonable suspicion precedents in analyzing 
probable cause and vice versa, see, for example, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–33 
(1983) (quoting several reasonable suspicion precedents in redefining probable cause); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 27 (1968) (citing several probable cause precedents in ex-
plaining reasonable suspicion standard). 
 80 See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir. 2003) (“In this Circuit, the 
validity of a Terry search does not depend upon the searching officer actually fearing the 
suspect is dangerous; rather, such a search is valid if a hypothetical officer in the same 
circumstances could reasonably believe the suspect is dangerous.”); United States v. 
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“We know of no legal require-
ment that a policeman must feel ‘scared’ by the threat of danger . . . so long as it is clear 
that he was aware of specific facts which would warrant a reasonable person to believe he 
was in danger.”); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146 (Colo. 1997) (“Although the troop-
ers in the current case may not have been subjectively concerned for their safety . . . , we 
nevertheless conclude that the search was objectively reasonable . . . .”); State v. Dumas, 
786 So. 2d 80, 81–82 (La. 2001) (“The reasonableness of a frisk . . . is . . . governed by an 
objective standard,” and thus “[t]he relevant question is not whether the police officer 
subjectively believes he is in danger, or whether he articulates that subjective belief in his 
testimony at a suppression hearing.”); Smigliano, 694 N.E.2d at 344 (“Because the facts 
and circumstances known to the officer are sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of 
operating under the influence in a reasonable police officer, a Terry stop is justified re-
gardless of the officer’s subjective state of mind.”); State v. Wallace, 772 A.2d 892, 896 
(N.H. 2001) (describing the defendant’s position that “the officer must subjectively sus-
pect the defendant of a crime” as “mistaken” given that the court has “adopted an objec-
tive test for determining whether a specific and articulable basis for the requisite suspi-
cion existed at the time of the stop”); State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D. 1995) 
(“[T]he reasonable-and-articulable-suspicion standard is objective, and it does not hinge 
upon the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer.”); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 169 
(Ohio 1993) (rejecting the notion that “a critical factor in determining whether the offi-
cer had reasonable suspicion that the detainee was armed is whether the officer is in fear 
for his or her safety”); State v. Vento, 604 N.W.2d 468, 470 (S.D. 1999) (whether “reason-
able suspicion existed when the stop was made is a determination based on an objective 
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analysis, they rely on the Supreme Court decisions adopting the per-
spective of “an objectively reasonable police officer” in defining prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion,81 as well as precedents like Whren 
v. United States that purportedly consider a police officer’s subjective 
state of mind irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.82 
Whren, of course, is the case in which the Supreme Court put a re-
sounding halt to claims of pretext searches.  In unanimously rejecting 
the defendants’ contention that the undercover narcotics officers 
who stopped their vehicle were really interested in investigating drug 
activity, rather than enforcing the traffic laws,83 the Court simply re-
sponded that the Fourth Amendment’s “concern with ‘reasonable-
ness’” permits certain law enforcement actions “whatever the subjec-
tive intent” of the individual police officers involved.84  Concluding 
that the traffic stop was reasonable because the officers had probable 
cause regarding a traffic violation, the Court “flatly dismissed the idea 
that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal 
justification.”85  “‘[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of 
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 
 
standard,” and therefore the officer’s “subjective beliefs were irrelevant”); O’Hara v. 
State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“[U]nder an objective analysis, it does 
not matter whether [the police officer] testified that he was afraid or was not afraid.”). 
 81 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (quoted supra at text accompanying 
note 9). 
 82 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  But cf. Kinports, supra note 7, at 77–95 
(pointing out that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shifts opportunistically 
between subjective and objective standards). 
 83 For evidence supporting this claim, see, e.g., David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All 
Other Traffic Offenses:  The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 550 & n.39 (1997) (noting that the primary officer testified he was 
“‘out there almost strictly to do drug investigations’ and that he stop[ped] drivers for traf-
fic offenses ‘[n]ot very often at all,’” and concluding “there was no doubt that their traffic 
enforcement actions were a pretext for drug investigation without probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion”); Daniel Yeager, Overcoming Hiddenness:  The Role of Intentions in Fourth 
Amendment Analysis, 74 MISS. L.J. 553, 591 (2004) (describing inconsistencies in the offi-
cers’ testimony concerning what traffic violations they observed and why they decided to 
stop the vehicle). 
 84 Whren, 517 U.S. at 814. 
 85 Id. at 812.  In subsequent cases, the Court has not limited Whren to searches based on 
probable cause.  See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (finding “no basis 
for examining official purpose” in a case involving warrantless search of the apartment of 
a probationer based only on reasonable suspicion); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 
337, 338 n.2 (2000) (noting, in analyzing whether the “tactile examination” of a bus pas-
senger’s luggage constituted a Fourth Amendment search, that “the issue is not [the offi-
cer’s] state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions”); see also City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46 (2000) (acknowledging that “the analytical rubric of Bond was 
not ‘ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 
813)). 
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justification for the officer’s action,’” the Court famously concluded, 
“‘does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, 
viewed objectively, justify that action.’”86 
Citing the Supreme Court’s refusal to look at the police officer’s 
subjective intent in Whren and other Fourth Amendment decisions,87 
the majority of lower courts have adopted a completely objective 
standard in analyzing the constitutionality of a Terry frisk.  Neverthe-
less, a number of lower court opinions interpret Terry’s reasonable 
suspicion standard as requiring both that the officer in question ac-
tually believe the suspect is armed and that the belief be a reasonable 
one.88  Still other courts have staked out an intermediate position:  
these courts view the relevant standard as essentially an objective one, 
but consider the officer’s subjective beliefs to be a relevant factor in 
determining how the reasonable police officer would have inter-
preted the circumstances.89 
 
 86 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
 87 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400, 405 (2006) (concluding that the exi-
gent circumstances exception applies so long as the police have “an objectively reason-
able basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured,” irrespective of whether 
their “subjective motives” for entering were to “gather evidence” or “assist the injured”); 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (holding that the officer’s “subjective rea-
son for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts 
provide probable cause”); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (noting that “the 
subjective intentions” underlying the officer’s decision to prolong the traffic stop by ask-
ing Robinette to get out of his car “did not make the continued detention of respondent 
illegal under the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20, 
922 n.23 (1984) (observing that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does 
not “turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers,” but instead on “the objec-
tively ascertainable question” whether “a reasonably well trained” police officer would 
have realized the search was unconstitutional). 
 88 See, e.g., United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 784 (1st Cir. 1989) (requiring that police 
“must have an actual suspicion that weapons are present before a Terry search can be 
made”); State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314, 317 (Me. 1985) (“A finding that a reasonable per-
son could have had a reasonable suspicion on the given facts is not alone sufficient”; in addi-
tion, “the court clearly must find that the police actually had such a suspicion at the time 
of the investigatory stop.”); State v. Lozada, 748 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ohio 2001) (observing 
that “this is not a Terry case because there was no evidence that Trooper Davies believed 
that the defendant was armed and dangerous”); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 224–25 
(Wyo. 1994) (concluding that stop was impermissible where police officer “admitted in 
his testimony that at no time . . . did he possess any articulable facts sufficient to create a 
reasonable suspicion,” even though “[h]ypothetically, a police officer could have pos-
sessed reasonable suspicions”); cf. State v. Miller, 191 P.3d 651, 658 (Or. 2008) (defining 
probable cause to require both that the police officer “acted on the belief that there was a 
legal justification for [the arrest] (the subjective component) and the officer’s belief was 
objectively reasonable (the objective component)”). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 580 n.5 (8th Cir. 2002) (observing that 
“the objective approach the Supreme Court has mandated” did not require the court to 
“ignore all evidence of Trooper Moore’s thought processes” because his “conclu-
sions . . . are at least some evidence of what a reasonable officer in [his] position would 
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Given the Supreme Court’s general hostility to subjective stan-
dards in its Fourth Amendment precedents, it is perhaps safer to as-
sume that the Court would side with the majority of lower courts and 
consider the perceptions of a reasonable police officer controlling in 
assessing the validity of a Terry frisk.90  Nevertheless, as discussed in 
the section that follows, support for the minority position can be 
found in some of the Court’s stop-and-frisk rulings. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Stop-and-Frisk Cases 
Although the Supreme Court has insisted that the definition of 
reasonable suspicion is an objective one,91 beginning with Terry itself, 
the Court created ambiguity as to whether reasonable suspicion in-
corporates any element of subjectivity.  On the one hand, the Terry 
Court called the relevant inquiry an “objective standard” and framed 
it in objective terms, asking “whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger.”92  Several pages later, however, the 
Court used more subjective language in summarizing its opinion as 
“merely hold[ing]” that a frisk is permissible if “a police officer ob-
serves unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of 
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the per-
sons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently danger-
 
have inferred from the facts and circumstances of the encounter”); United States v. Prim, 
698 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Although the existence of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause is judicially viewed under an objective standard, it is a standard applied to 
the actual and/or perceived belief of the law enforcement officer as he either stops and 
detains or engages in search and seizure.”); People v. Flowers, 688 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ill. 
1997) (“Although the standard is an objective one, the officer’s subjective belief regard-
ing the safety of the situation is one of the factors that may be considered in determining 
whether a weapons frisk was valid under Terry.”); State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 592 (Utah 
2003) (Even though “an objective standard must be applied to determine the reason-
ableness of a Terry frisk under the totality of the circumstances,” the officer’s “subjective 
belief may nevertheless be factored into the objective analysis, though it is never alone 
determinative.”); State v. Kyles, 675 N.W.2d 449, 458, 452 (Wis. 2004) (“[A]n officer’s 
own evaluation of the circumstances may provide insight to factor into the objective anal-
ysis. . . . A court may therefore consider an officer’s belief that his or her safety or that of 
others was or was not in danger in determining whether the objective standard of reason-
able suspicion was met.”). 
 90 But cf. infra notes 137–143 and accompanying text (suggesting that the minority view is 
not inconsistent with a narrow reading of the Whren line of cases). 
 91 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 92 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968); see also id. at 21–22 (“[W]ould the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))). 
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ous.”93  Although this language mandates that the officer’s belief must 
be objectively reasonable, it also seems to envision that the circum-
stances must actually “lead” the particular officer to “conclude” that 
the suspect is armed. 
Likewise, in Sibron v. New York, one of the companion cases to Ter-
ry, the Court suggested the importance of the police officer’s subjec-
tive beliefs, noting that the officer “must be able to point to particular 
facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed 
and dangerous.”94  Moreover, in applying the reasonable suspicion 
standard and finding inadequate support for the frisk conducted in 
that case, the Court examined the particular police officer’s subjec-
tive intent.  Specifically, the Court observed that Officer Martin never 
“seriously suggest[ed] that he was in fear of bodily harm 
and . . . searched Sibron in self-protection to find weapons,” but ra-
ther “made it abundantly clear” that he frisked Sibron because he 
“sought narcotics.”95 
Language to similar effect in subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
likewise seems to assume that the officer in question must subjectively 
believe the suspect is armed in order to satisfy the reasonable suspi-
cion standard.  Thus, in Maryland v. Buie, the Court characterized the 
reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a protective sweep as requir-
ing that “the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 
specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an in-
dividual posing a danger.”96  Likewise, Michigan v. Long allowed a Terry 
“frisk” of a car so long as “the police officer possesses a reasonable be-
lief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably war-
rant’ the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and . . . may 
gain immediate control of weapons.”97  And in Adams v. Williams, the 
Court described the purpose of a frisk as “allow[ing] the officer to 
pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” “not to discover evi-
dence of crime.”98 
 
 93 Id. at 30 (emphasis added); see also id. (requiring as well that “nothing in the initial stages 
of the encounter serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety” 
(emphasis added)). 
 94 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 95 Id. at 46, 64 (emphasis added). 
 96 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (emphasis added); see also id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(pointing out that “Officer Rozar testified that he was not worried about any possible 
danger when he arrested Buie”). 
 97 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
 98 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 
784 (2009) (“To justify a patdown . . . the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that 
the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (requiring that the officer “must have a particularized and objec-
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Although these cases obviously have an objective component—
they require that the officer’s suspicions be reasonably grounded—
they seem to require as well an actual subjective fear on the part of 
the officer.  As the First Circuit succinctly pointed out, “[a]n officer 
cannot have a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dan-
gerous when he in fact has no such suspicion.”99 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the contrary position is the prevail-
ing view among the lower courts, and it likewise enjoys some scholarly 
support.  Thus, for example, Wayne LaFave describes the Terry stan-
dard as “purely objective,” incorporating “no requirement that an ac-
tual suspicion by the officer be shown.”100  But even he paraphrases 
Terry in subjective terms—as allowing a stop when the officer “rea-
sonably believes that the person may be guilty of a crime.”101  Moreover, 
he reaches his conclusion in responding to the “concern” that Terry 
stops not be allowed based on “the subjective judgment” of the po-
lice, thus according them “carte blanche to detain ‘on a purely sub-
jective reaction.’”102  In viewing the Terry analysis as strictly objective, 
however, LaFave makes the jump from the noncontroversial proposi-
tion that a police officer’s subjective belief in the permissibility of her 
actions is by itself insufficient to support their constitutionality to the 
very different point—the one in question here—that the officer’s sub-
jective beliefs are completely irrelevant. 
The language in Terry cited in support of a purely objective ap-
proach to reasonable suspicion arose in a similar context.  In explain-
ing the need for an objective inquiry, the Court reasoned that “it is 
 
tive basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”); Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (summarizing Terry as allowing an officer, “for his own pro-
tection and safety, [to] conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or 
suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted”). 
 99 United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 784 (1st Cir. 1989). 
100 4 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 9.5(a), at 472; see also id. § 9.6(a), at 623 (likewise assuming 
that “[t]he test [for a frisk] is an objective rather than a subjective one, just as with the 
probable cause needed to arrest or search, and thus it is not essential that the officer ac-
tually have been in fear”); cf. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 25, § 8.02[B], at 122 
(noting that “an officer’s lack of belief that she has probable cause does not foreclose a 
finding to the contrary”).  But cf. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 3.2(b), at 38 (recognizing 
that “a purely objective test” might not make sense in one type of scenario—where an of-
ficer seized a container that “‘he did not know nor even suspect . . . contained anything 
other than cigarette tobacco’”—though finding it “debatable” “[w]hether such a fine dis-
tinction is sound” (quoting DiPasquale v. State, 406 A.2d 665, 667 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1979))); Bradley, supra note 44, at 356–69 (advocating an objective standard to evaluate 
frisks, but a more subjective approach in measuring probable cause and the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to stop). 
101 4 LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 9.5(a), at 472. 
102 Id. at 471–72 (quoting N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PENAL LAW 
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1964)). 
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imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard” be-
cause “simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not 
enough.’”103  “‘If subjective good faith alone were the test,’” the Court 
continued, “‘the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evapo-
rate, and the people would be “secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects,” only in the discretion of the police.’”104  Thus, as 
the Supreme Court and LaFave both recognize, a police officer’s sub-
jective good faith is insufficient to validate law enforcement tech-
niques that do not satisfy objective standards of conduct.  That obser-
vation, however, provides no basis for preferring a purely objective 
test and ignoring the police officer’s subjective beliefs.  Moreover, the 
policies underlying the Fourth Amendment discussed in the next sec-
tion suggest the importance of retaining both objective and subjective 
considerations in analyzing reasonable suspicion. 
C.  Fourth Amendment Policies 
Just because a strictly objective definition of reasonable suspicion 
is not mandated by Supreme Court precedent does not, of course, 
make it wrong.  In fact, however, it is wrong, even taking the views of 
the Fourth Amendment favored by the current Court.  Much has 
been made of the single-minded emphasis on deterrence in contem-
porary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.105  In recent years, that 
emphasis has led the Court to focus in some cases on reasonableness 
and in others on the police officer’s culpability.  But whether one 
views police culpability, deterrence, or general notions of reason-
ableness as preeminent, the purely objective approach to reasonable 
 
103 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) 
(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959))). 
104 Id. at 22 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 97); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 
n.13 (1984) (making the same point). 
105 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (observing that the Court has 
“focused on the efficacy of the [exclusionary] rule in deterring Fourth Amendment viola-
tions”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (calling the exclusionary rule “our 
last resort, not our first impulse . . . applicable only . . . ‘where its deterrence benefits 
outweigh its “substantial social costs”’” (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 
U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907))); Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (noting that 
“the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct”).  But see Herring, 129 S. Ct. 
at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing the views of four Justices and endorsing “a 
more majestic conception” of the exclusionary rule (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).  For criticism of both the Herring dissent and the 
views of the majority, see Donald A. Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate:  From “Still 
Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence” (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 09-009, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1376480 (con-
cluding that “both blocs are wrong”). 
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suspicion is flawed.  The policies the Court claims underlie the 
Fourth Amendment therefore suggest that a frisk cannot be justified 
where the police officer actually believed the suspect posed no dan-
ger. 
In its opinion last Term in Herring v. United States, the Supreme 
Court focused on the personal culpability of the particular police of-
ficer involved in the case, refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to 
an “isolated” case of police “negligence.”106  Rather, the Court re-
stricted the exclusionary remedy to “deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 
negligence.”107  Using the culpability rubric, an officer who proceeds 
to frisk a suspect without any belief that the suspect is armed is clearly 
acting with a culpability greater than negligence.  The limitations of 
Terry are well known, and a police officer who conducts a frisk to un-
cover evidence108 or out of habit109—and with no fear for her safety—
cannot be considered merely negligent.110 
 
106 129 S. Ct. at 698 (involving a situation where officer reasonably believed there was an out-
standing warrant for the defendant’s arrest, but in fact the warrant had been recalled and 
never deleted from the police department’s computer database).  The Court also men-
tioned that the officer’s negligence was “attenuated from the arrest” in Herring, but did 
not elaborate further or indicate how important the notion of “attenuation” was to its 
conclusion.  Id.  For a discussion of Herring’s attenuation language, see Posting of Richard 
McAdams to the University of Chicago Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com 
/faculty/mcadams_richard/(Jan. 17, 2009, 0:06 CST). 
107 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (reasoning that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police con-
duct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and suffi-
ciently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”).  For a 
trenchant attack on Herring, see Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring:  A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 
(2009). 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2001) (pointing out that the dis-
trict court found that the frisk was actually “an intentional search for evidence of a 
crime”); United States v. Prim, 698 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[Officer] really ex-
pected to find narcotics . . . and used the pat-down as a ruse.”); People v. Altman, 938 
P.2d 142, 146 (Colo. 1997) (“[T]he district court determined that the troopers’ motive in 
searching Altman’s vehicle was to determine what Altman had put underneath his seat, 
not to conduct a protective search due to safety concerns.”); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 504–05 (1983) (plurality opinion) (concluding that police exceeded the permissible 
scope of Terry because there was “no indication” that “reasons of safety and security” 
“prompted [them] to transfer the site of the encounter”; instead, their “primary interest” 
was in searching the defendant’s luggage). 
109 See, e.g., People v. Flowers, 688 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ill. 1997) (officer performed frisk “simply 
because it was his routine to frisk persons stopped for investigatory questioning”); State v. 
Lozada, 748 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ohio 2001) (officer admitted that his “standard practice” 
was to conduct a frisk during a traffic stop); O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 549 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000) (officer’s “standard procedure” was to frisk the driver and then “have 
the individual sit inside his patrol car”); State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 593 (Utah 2003) 
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Admittedly, the Court asserted somewhat mysteriously in Herring 
that “[t]he pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objec-
tive, not an ‘inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting offi-
cers.’”111  But it is difficult to reconcile that comment with the Court’s 
acknowledgment just two sentences later that an officer’s “knowl-
edge” is relevant in assessing good faith—as well as in evaluating 
probable cause.112  In addition, the very notion of culpability seems to 
be a subjective one, and in fact the Court drew a distinction in Herring 
between a “‘negligen[t] or innocent mistake’” and one that is “‘de-
liberate’” or “knowing[],” a distinction phrased explicitly in subjec-
tive terms.113  Despite the Court’s reference to objective analytical 
frameworks, then, an officer who frisks a suspect she does not believe 
to be armed does not seem to fall on the negligence side of Herring’s 
culpability line. 
A purely objective approach to reasonable suspicion is similarly 
indefensible under the notion of deterrence simpliciter.  Using de-
terrence as the starting point, the judicial system can hope to influ-
ence the conduct of the police officer who conducts a frisk despite 
her subjective belief that the suspect is unarmed.  Although the Court 
asserted in United States v. Leon that “[g]rounding [Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine] in objective reasonableness . . . retains the value of 
the exclusionary rule as an incentive” for the police to comply with 
constitutional dictates,114 its opinion in Herring recognized that deter-
rence is actually easier to achieve when an officer acts with subjective 
awareness than when her actions fail to satisfy an objective standard 
 
(officer “performs a Terry frisk as a matter of routine on anyone he orders out of a vehi-
cle”). 
110 Cf. Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, TRIAL, Apr. 2009, at 
52, 53–54 (taking the position that police misconduct will “likely” be considered merely 
negligent so long as the officers “thought their conduct was consistent with constitutional 
requirements,” and predicting that “in most cases, it will be impossible” for defendants to 
prove “‘systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements’” (quoting 
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702)). 
111 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (quoting petitioner’s reply brief). 
112 Id. (quoted supra at note 61).  For further discussion of police knowledge as an element 
of an objective standard, see supra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
113 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); cf. id. at 
710 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “[i]t is not clear how the Court 
squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of the exclu-
sionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the police” (citing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996))). 
114 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 261 n.15 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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of reasonableness.115  This is a lesson that criminal law has long rec-
ognized as well.116 
Finally, the Court described its “general Fourth Amendment ap-
proach” in Samson v. California not in terms of deterrence or police 
culpability, but as a free-wheeling balancing test, pursuant to which 
the Court “‘examin[es] the totality of the circumstances’ to deter-
mine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”117  “Whether a search is reasonable,” the Court 
continued, turns on balancing the “‘intru[sion] upon an individual’s 
privacy’” against “‘the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.’”118  Given the current Court’s view that deterring impermissible 
police behavior is the predominant “legitimate governmental inter-
est[]” underlying the Fourth Amendment, in theory the results of this 
balancing process should not be much different from a deterrence-
driven approach (especially when coupled with Herring’s emphasis on 
culpability).119 
Arguably, however, Samson’s ad hoc balancing test could be used 
to defend a purely objective definition of reasonable suspicion—by 
characterizing a frisk as a minor intrusion and finding that “legiti-
 
115 See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (observing that the “‘deterrent value of the exclusionary rule 
is most likely to be effective’ when ‘official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth 
Amendment rights’” (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part))); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 n.6 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting that “focusing on deliberateness” reaches the 
“conduct that is most culpable . . . and most susceptible to being checked by a deter-
rent”).  At times, even the Leon Court seemed to acknowledge this point.  See Leon, 468 
U.S. at 919 (pointing out that “‘[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessar-
ily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct’” 
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)) (emphasis added)); id. (noting 
that if the exclusionary rule is intended to deter constitutional violations, it should apply 
“only if” the police “had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional” (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)) 
(emphasis added)). 
116 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 cmt. at 86–87 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (describing 
the view that “inadvertent negligence is not a sufficient basis for criminal conviction, both 
on the utilitarian ground that threatened sanctions cannot influence the inadvertent ac-
tor and on the moral ground that criminal punishment should be reserved for cases in-
volving conscious fault”). 
117 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (relying on general notions of reason-
ableness in upholding the warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee whose release 
had been conditioned on his submission to a broad range of searches) (quoting United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
118 Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19). 
119 See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 n.4 (2009) (refusing to apply the exclu-
sionary rule to cases of isolated police negligence, despite acknowledging that the exclu-
sionary remedy could have some “deterrent effect” in such cases, because “exclusion is 
not worth the cost” under the balancing test). 
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mate governmental interests” are served so long as a reasonable offi-
cer would have deemed a frisk to be necessary.  On the other hand, 
allowing an officer with no subjective fear of a suspect to conduct a 
Terry frisk does not sound particularly “reasonable.”  If the officer’s 
“mere ‘hunch’” would not qualify as reasonable suspicion,120 then the 
construct of the hypothetical reasonable police officer cannot justi-
fiably be used to “convert[]” that “hunch . . . into a ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ by second thoughts developed at the suppression hearing.”121 
Principles of tort and criminal law confirm this view.  In these ar-
eas of the law, objective standards supplement rather than supplant 
subjective inquiries.  Thus, a self-defense claim is unavailable to a 
criminal defendant who does not actually believe her victim consti-
tutes a threat, even if the reasonable person confronting the same 
circumstances would fear for her life.122  Likewise, one who is unper-
turbed by provocation that would enrage a reasonable person cannot 
take advantage of the heat of passion defense and is therefore con-
victed of murder rather than voluntary manslaughter.123  In the realm 
of tort law, as discussed above, the driver who is aware of a pothole 
and fails to take appropriate precautions can be held to be negligent 
even if a reasonable person would not have realized there were any 
defects in the road.124  Given that the objective standards used in tort 
and criminal law are likewise designed to assess culpability125 and de-
 
120 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968)). 
121 State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314, 317 (Me. 1985); cf. United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 
784 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that “where a search has been made without any legal ba-
sis, we do not think that an ex post facto reconstruction based upon an argument of ob-
jective reasonableness can validate the search” because “[w]hile other officers might have 
viewed the situation differently, it is the conduct of these officers which we are judging”); 
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (noting, in rejecting an objective defini-
tion of reasonable suspicion, that “[o]ur constitutional guarantees would mean little if 
any search or seizure which produced evidence of criminal conduct was justified post 
hoc”). 
122 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(c), at 147–50 (2d ed. 2003). 
123 See id. § 15.2(c), at 506. 
124 See supra text accompanying note 66; see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
212–13 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (observing that willful, wanton, or reck-
less conduct constitutes “an aggravated form of negligence, . . . which is so far from a 
proper state of mind that it . . . may justify a broader duty, and more extended liability for 
consequences”). 
125 See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur:  Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and 
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 789 (1994) (describing “the moral norm 
implicit in the reasonable person test” used to evaluate self-defense claims); George P. 
Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1290 (1974) 
(“[T]he standard of the reasonable person provides a substitute for inquiries about the 
actor’s character and culpability.”). 
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ter undesirable behavior,126 here, as well, the police officer who does 
not actually believe a suspect is armed should not be deemed to have 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to frisk. 
Even though balancing tests like the one applied in Samson are 
notoriously subject to manipulation,127 a strictly objective definition of 
reasonable suspicion comes up short whether one focuses on police 
officer culpability, deterrence of unconstitutional police behavior, or 
even general notions of reasonableness.  Allowing frisks of suspects 
who an officer does not subjectively believe to be dangerous is prob-
lematic for yet another reason:  coming back full circle to the ques-
tion discussed in Part I, a purely objective approach to reasonable 
suspicion cannot be reconciled with the notion that police training 
and experience are relevant in making probable cause and reason-
able suspicion determinations.  The link between the two issues is ad-
dressed in the following section. 
III.  CONNECTING THE DOTS 
Although both of the issues discussed above have generated a con-
flict among the lower courts, the majority of them treat the two issues 
differently, considering a police officer’s training, experience, and 
knowledge in assessing probable cause and reasonable suspicion, but 
ignoring the officer’s subjective beliefs in analyzing the permissibility 
of a Terry frisk.  But the same reasoning that has led the courts to take 
a police officer’s training and experience into account in measuring 
probable cause dictates that the officer’s fear of the suspect should be 
considered in evaluating the justifications for a Terry frisk.  If it is ap-
propriate in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap to credit what Officer Devlin sub-
jectively knew about drug deals and the particular Philadelphia 
neighborhood in deciding whether his observations gave him prob-
able cause to arrest,128 then it is likewise appropriate in Sibron v. New 
 
126 See, e.g., Regina v. Morhall, (1996) 1 A.C. 90, 97–98 (H.L.) (pointing out that the purpose 
of the reasonable person test in voluntary manslaughter cases is “to introduce, as a matter 
of policy, a standard of self-control which has to be complied with if provocation is to be 
established in law”); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 124, at 173 
(noting that “[t]he whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of 
behavior”). 
127 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
393–94 (1974) (concluding that a “sliding scale approach . . . converts” the Fourth 
Amendment into “one immense Rorschach blot,” which can “only produce more slide 
than scale” and “means in practice . . . that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial 
courts defer to the police”). 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 1 & 28–31 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. 
Ct. 448 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
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York to acknowledge that Officer Martin did not subjectively believe 
Sibron was armed in evaluating the frisk at issue there.129 
One conceivable objection to equating the two scenarios might be 
that there is a distinction between relying on an officer’s “knowledge” 
in assessing probable cause and considering her subjective “beliefs” in 
evaluating reasonable suspicion.  Even without going as far as the 
postmodern position that all knowledge is contingent,130 this pur-
ported distinction quickly breaks down.131  In Dunlap, Officer Devlin 
may have actually “known” where he was conducting surveillance and 
how many prior drug arrests he had made in the area.  But, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’ assertion notwithstanding, the officer did not “know” 
the neighborhood was “[t]ough as a three-dollar steak.”132  Nor did he 
“know” that Dunlap “wasn’t buying bus tokens”133 or “making change 
for a dollar.”134  Rather, it was the officer’s “belief” that he had just 
witnessed a drug transaction.  Likewise, in Herring, Investigator 
Anderson could not have “known” there was an outstanding warrant 
for Herring’s arrest, when the warrant had in fact been recalled some 
months earlier.135 
This is not to say, of course, that Officer Devlin needed to know 
for certain what “small objects” had been exchanged in order to 
 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95 (discussing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 
(1968)).  For an opinion drawing this link, see State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 596 (Utah 
2003) (noting—in support of its observation that the officer involved in the case is “in the 
best position to evaluate the circumstances and determine the reasonableness of a Terry 
frisk”—that “[i]n fact, in other situations, an officer’s subjective factual determination 
based on experience and specialized training has been given due weight as part of the ob-
jective analysis” and the Supreme Court “[t]hus . . . has demonstrated that there are sub-
jective elements that may be considered in an otherwise objective analysis” (citing United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002))); cf. State v. Kyles, 675 N.W.2d 449, 457 (Wis. 2004) 
(rejecting the State’s contention that police officers should not even be questioned about 
their subjective fears of the suspect, though declining to “address the defendant’s litany 
of unintended consequences”—i.e., that “under the State’s position, . . . an officer’s par-
ticular training, experience, and perceptions [could not] be considered in determining 
the reasonableness of a protective search for weapons” (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 270–71, 
for the proposition that an officer’s “subjective interpretation of the facts is considered as 
part of the totality of circumstances”)). 
130 See generally JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION:  A REPORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (defining postmod-
ernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives”). 
131 Cf. Bradley, supra note 44, at 363 (observing that “[i]t cannot, or at least should not, be 
said that facts are ‘known’ to the officer if he does not believe those ‘facts’”). 
132 Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. at 448 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
133 Id. 
134 Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 681 (Pa. 2007) (Saylor, J., concurring). 
135 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (discussed supra at notes 106–113 and 
accompanying text). 
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make an arrest.136  But just as Officer Devlin’s trained beliefs about 
drugs deals and neighborhoods can help give rise to probable cause, 
so Officer Martin’s trained belief that Sibron was unarmed suggests 
an absence of the reasonable suspicion required to frisk. 
Introducing this element of subjectivity in measuring probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion can arguably be reconciled even with 
much of the Court’s reasoning in the Whren line of cases.  Criminal 
law typically considers a defendant’s motives for acting irrelevant in as-
sessing mens rea,137 and so too much of the Court’s discussion of “in-
tent” and “subjective” considerations in Whren and its progeny really 
involves the police officer’s underlying motives, rather than her 
knowledge (or even her purpose).138  In Whren itself, for example, the 
Court rejected the defendants’ claim that undercover narcotics offi-
cers had an “ulterior motive” for stopping the vehicle that had noth-
ing to do with enforcing the traffic laws.139  Likewise, in Brigham City v. 
Stuart, the Court refused to limit the exigent circumstances exception 
to cases where the “subjective motives” of the police who made a war-
rantless entry were to “assist the injured” rather than “gather evi-
dence.”140  Thus, a narrow reading of Whren and its ilk—as foreclosing 
consideration of police motives in ruling on Fourth Amendment 
challenges141—is not inconsistent with taking into account an officer’s 
 
136 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983) (noting that “probable cause re-
quires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing 
of such activity”). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11–12 (1976) (per curiam) (refusing to 
require evidence of evil motive to prove “willful” filing of false tax returns); Boyle v. State, 
214 S.W.3d 250, 254 (Ark. 2005) (refusing to credit evidence of good motive on the 
grounds that an intentional killing qualifies as murder even if “motivated by love rather 
than malice”).  See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 122, § 5.3(a), at 358 (discussing the rela-
tionship between a defendant’s motive and criminal intent). 
138 In criminal law parlance, a defendant acts knowingly if she was aware of what she was do-
ing and purposely if she wanted to act in the way she did (irrespective of her underlying 
motive for doing so).  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, at 225 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
139 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (described supra at notes 83–86 and 
accompanying text). 
140 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (discussed supra at note 87); cf. Herring 
v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009) (distinguishing permissible inquiries concern-
ing a police officer’s “knowledge” from impermissible consideration of her “subjective in-
tent”) (quoted supra at note 61); see also supra note 87 (citing additional Supreme Court 
opinions). 
141 Further evidencing the Court’s lack of consistency in this area, it has even made refer-
ence to police motive in Fourth Amendment rulings subsequent to Whren.  See Kinports, 
supra note 7, at 84–86 & nn.59 & 66 (citing cases where the Supreme Court has evaluated 
the subjective motivations of officers).  The most recent example is Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. 
Ct. 1710 (2009), where the Court noted that searches incident to arrest are “reasonable 
‘in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use’ and ‘in order to prevent 
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knowledge and beliefs, either in assessing probable cause or in evalu-
ating the reasonableness of a Terry frisk. 
Admittedly, some Supreme Court opinions contain more sweep-
ing language, suggesting the irrelevance of any subjective factors in 
Fourth Amendment cases.142  But these more expansive statements 
cannot be reconciled with the Court’s express recognition that a po-
lice officer’s knowledge is important, for example, in assessing prob-
able cause.  As discussed above, asking what a particular police officer 
knew is quintessentially a subjective inquiry.143 
In fact, a standard framed in purely objective terms would ana-
lyze—in evaluating the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a 
Terry frisk, for instance—whether a reasonable police officer would 
have feared the suspect was armed given what that reasonable officer 
knew based on her particular training and experience.  That is, rea-
sonable suspicion would exist if the officer actually involved in the 
case should have been aware of evidence giving rise to a reasonable 
belief that the suspect was carrying a weapon.144  A truly objective 
standard would therefore focus entirely on the reasonable police offi-
cer—and what she would have believed based on the information she 
would have had. 
That, of course, is not the position the courts have taken in Fourth 
Amendment cases.  Instead, the courts—including the Supreme 
Court145—require that probable cause and reasonable suspicion de-
terminations be made based on the information available to the par-
ticular officer in question.146  And they are correct in doing so.  If a 
 
[the] concealment or destruction’ of evidence,” and warned that “a broad reading of 
[these rules would] give[] police limitless discretion to conduct exploratory searches.”  Id. 
at 1716, 1720 n.5 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (emphasis add-
ed)). 
142 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000) (citing Whren in support of 
the more general proposition that a police officer’s “subjective intent . . . is irrelevant in 
determining whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment”); Maryland v. 
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1985) (noting that “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state 
of mind at the time the challenged action was taken” (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 136 (1978))). 
143 See supra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
144 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12 cmt. A (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting that “[t]ort law has always inquired into what the 
actor ‘knew or should have known’”). 
145 See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the 
objective definition of reasonable suspicion requires courts to “look to the record as a 
whole to determine what facts were known to the officer and then consider whether a 
reasonable officer in those circumstances would have been suspicious”); United States v. 
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particular officer, for example, associated a “rusty” screw and a 
“somewhat loose” panel in a car with normal “wear and tear” rather 
than hidden contraband,147 or thought that the best route to a popu-
lar tourist attraction was the “unpaved and primitive” one the suspect 
was taking,148 then the fact that some other officer could reasonably 
have drawn a different inference should not help provide the neces-
sary quantum of suspicion.149  Applying a strictly objective standard 
and upholding a stop or arrest on the theory that some reasonable 
police officer might have had the information necessary to justify it 
would allow prosecutors and courts to speculate about an infinite 
number of potentially suspicious circumstances and would thereby go 
a long way towards eliminating any sort of suspicion requirement. 
Thus, taking into account a particular police officer’s knowledge, 
training, and experience injects a subjective inquiry into the probable 
cause analysis that as a matter of consistency should also be imported 
into the reasonable suspicion standard applied to Terry frisks.  Admit-
tedly, the result is, as the Devenpeck Court feared, that probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion determinations may “vary” depending on 
the location and timing of the incident in question and the officer’s 
status as a veteran or a rookie.150  But those same variations became a 
distinct possibility as soon as the Court acknowledged the relevance 
of the officer’s training and experience—and (as even Devenpeck itself 
recognized)151 her knowledge—in evaluating probable cause.  More-
 
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (endorsing an objective ap-
proach to reasonable suspicion, but demanding proof that the officer was “aware of spe-
cific facts which would warrant a reasonable person to believe he was in danger”); State v. 
Kyles, 675 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Wis. 2004) (noting that “[i]n determining whether a frisk 
was reasonable, a court may look ‘to any fact in the record, as long as it was known to the 
officer at the time he conducted the frisk’” (quoting State v. McGill, 609 N.W.2d 795, 802 
(Wis. 2000))). 
147 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693, 700 (1996) (described supra at notes 16–17 
and accompanying text). 
148 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (described supra at notes 12–15 and ac-
companying text). 
149 Even the “collective knowledge” doctrine, which allows the courts to pool the knowledge 
of different police officers in assessing probable cause, insists that the officers involved in 
the case must have actually been aware of the suspicious circumstances.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Madroza-Acosta, 221 F. App’x 756, 761 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying the “fellow 
officer rule,” and examining in detail precisely what information was “actually provided” 
to the police); United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing 
that the “collective knowledge doctrine” requires the courts to ascertain “what knowledge 
can be imputed to the officers at the time that they arrested” the suspect). 
150 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (quoted supra at text accompanying note 
21). 
151 See id. at 152, 155 (quoted supra at notes 23–24 and accompanying text). 
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over, they are no more open to criticism as “arbitrarily variable”152 
than other differences in outcome that result because of some factual 
peculiarity in the case, and that predictably occur in applying the fact-
intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances definitions of probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion the Court has given us.153 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen the Supreme Court fluctuating inexplica-
bly between objective and subjective standards in articulating the 
Fourth Amendment rules that govern police searches and seizures.  
The Court now has an opportunity to repair some of the damage and 
begin to move toward greater consistency by resolving the conflict 
that has arisen in the lower courts concerning the relevance of a po-
lice officer’s subjective beliefs in analyzing the permissibility of a Terry 
frisk.  Just as the Court has repeatedly indicated that a particular po-
lice officer’s knowledge, training, and experience help inform de-
terminations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, so too the 
officer’s subjective belief that a suspect was unarmed should be con-
sidered in assessing the reasonable suspicion required to justify a 
frisk. 
 
152 Id. at 154 (quoted supra at text accompanying note 20). 
153 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 238 n.11 (1983) (describing probable cause as 
“a fluid concept” that “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual con-
texts [and is] not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” and cau-
tioning that “[t]here are so many variables in the probable-cause equation that one de-
termination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for another”). 
